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This study documents the existence of a positive-negative asymmetry in analysts’ consensus 
earnings forecast revisions. We find that upward revisions are more informative than downward 
revisions. After controlling for momentum, extreme downward revisions contain little incremental 
information compared with moderate downward revisions. The differential richness of information set in 
good and bad news revisions is more pronounced among bigger, more heavily covered stocks and stocks 
with higher institutional holding, i.e. stocks typically are more prone to the analyst agency problem. 
These findings are consistent with the claim that analysts systematically struggle with bad news 




This study examines whether the richness of the information set differs across the upward and 
downward consensus earnings forecast revisions1
Fisch & Sale, 2002
. We are motivated by analysts’ role as agent acting on 
behalf of multiple principals ( ). As analyst principal-agent conflicts are generally 
attenuated with good news but exacerbated with bad news, analysts systematically struggle with bad 
news. To report or not to report, and if yes, what and when to report might no longer be a 
straightforward function of analysts’ true views alone, but a much more complex decision that may also 
include many other often conflicting considerations. We hypothesize that this asymmetric principal-
agent conflict dynamics could give rise to the loss of information in analysts’ downward forecast 
revisions, especially among stocks that conflicts are expected to be the most severe. 
An extant literature examined the information content of analysts’ individual and consensus 
earnings forecast revisions using the criteria of association between forecast revisions and future 
abnormal stock returns2 Givoly & Lakonishok, 1979( ; Lys & Sohn, 1990; Stickel, 1991). Two main 
stylized facts have emerged3
Chan, Jegadeesh, & Lakonishok, 1996
. First, forecast revisions, both their direction and magnitude, do convey 
price sensitive information. Second, the price reaction to the disclosure of analysts’ forecasts is 
relatively slow and gradual. Indeed, the post-revision price drift is now widely acknowledged as a 
general class of earnings momentum strategy where expectations of future earnings are proxied by 
revisions in analyst earnings forecasts ( ).  
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise specified, in this paper we use “analyst revisions”, “forecast revisions”, or simply “revisions” to refer to 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecast revisions. 
2 Following literature, we use “informativeness”, “value relevance”, “usefulness” and “return association” interchangeably 
referring to the quality or richness of the information in analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.  
3 See Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) for a good review. 
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While previous studies collectively provide robust evidence that analyst forecast revisions are 
indeed informative, the question that whether they are equally informative across good and bad news is 
rarely attempted. The limited evidences presented so far are mixed.  Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2006) 
do touch upon the topic. They find that analysts’ bad news forecast revisions are more informative than 
good news revisions and conclude that market has greater foreknowledge of the information in analysts’ 
positive forecast revisions. In a separate stream of literature on manager disclosure, it is commonly 
believed that bad news manager forecasts/guidance are more credible and hence more informative 
(Anilowski, Feng, & Skinner, 2007; Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003) and managers accelerate bad news 
disclosures due to litigation concerns (Skinner & Sloan, 2002; Soffer, Thiagarajan, & Walther, 2000). 
Since manager disclosure is an important information source for analysts, these papers could also 
suggest greater informativeness in analysts’ downward earnings forecast revisions, apparently at odds 
with our prediction.  
However, other related studies support our conjecture, though indirectly. Prior studies document 
asymmetric analyst behaviors when recommending stocks. Analysts tend to herd more for downgrades 
(Jegadeesh & Kim, 2010); analysts are more likely to downgrade post large price declines which 
alleviate some pressure on analysts to withhold bad news (Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, & Rountree, 
2006). Such asymmetric behavior could result in some loss of information in analysts’ downgrades after 
negative price jumps (Jiang & Kim, 2010). On earnings forecasts, Gu and Xue (2008) find that when 
economic incentive misalignment is alleviated by analyst independence the marginal improvement in 
analyst forecast informativeness is greater for bad news. These evidences do not directly prove that good 
news revisions are unconditionally more informative, but they point to the same general direction of our 
prediction and support the agency story that is at the root of our asymmetry conjecture. Given the 
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ambiguous evidences and predictions from past studies, we think the asymmetric price reaction after 
upward and downward revisions warrants closer scrutiny. 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), it is now well known that stock return is predictable based 
on past stock returns. If analysts simply mimic past price actions to revise earnings forecasts, their 
revisions will necessarily appear informative; but the incremental information attributable to analysts is 
minimal as past price action is already publicly available. Indeed, the positive association between prior 
price changes and analyst forecast revisions4
1991
 has been documented as early as Givoly and Lakonishok 
(1979) and Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985). Abarbanell ( ) argue that such association does not 
necessarily mean forecasts explicitly depend upon prior price changes and analysts’ forecasts contain 
more of their private signal. Chan et al. (1996) provide a detailed analysis on the interactions of price 
momentum and earning momentum and conclude that neither effect subsumes the other. In sum, past 
studies suggest analysts’ revisions are incrementally informative overall. However, is this overall 
incremental informativeness largely driven by the upward revisions? We address this question directly 
and predict less informativeness incremental to preceded public signals in large downward revisions.  
We calculate revision (REVt) as the month-on-month change in consensus earnings forecast 
scaled by stock price in the last month. Excluding zero revisions, our entire sample is dichotomized into 
upward (REV+) and downward revisions (REV-). Within each group, each month, we sort stocks into 
quartiles from low to high based on REVt and form eight portfolios in total, four in REV- (P1 to P4) and 
four in REV+ (P6 to P9). To provide some quick intuition, we first search and document four asymmetric 
and/or systematic patterns in our revisions data. We find that, first, the positive autocorrelation in REV- 
appear more evident than that in REV+, confirming the intuition that analysts respond more sluggishly to 
                                                          
4  Positive association is also found between past stock returns and analyst revisions in target price. Firms that receive an 
upward (downward) revision in target price behave like other “winner” (“loser”) firms (Brav & Lehavy, 2003). Conrad et al. 
(2006) also suggest analyst stock recommendation is closely related to prior stock price actions at least in bad news. 
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bad news. Second, the positive association between past return and revision is much stronger in REV- 
than that in REV+, consistent with our prediction that downward revisions might not contain as much 
information beyond momentum as upward revisions do. Third, the positive relationship between 
revision and future stock return is only visually observable in REV+ indicating asymmetric information 
quality. Interestingly, after we adjust for stock characteristics including momentum, the revision and 
subsequent stock return relation is reversed at the extreme downward revision stocks, which yield but 
slightly higher excess returns than those received moderate negative revisions. Though quick and dirty, 
these visual evidences provide a preview of our key findings – the unconditional asymmetric 
informativeness across good and bad news revisions and the inferior quality of information in larger vs. 
smaller downward revisions conditional on prior price actions. Finally, compared with those with 
moderate revisions, stocks which receive extreme revisions, upward or downward, tend to be younger, 
smaller, with lower prices, lighter analyst coverage and lower institutional holdings. It appears that they 
are inherently more volatile and/or analysts have more discretion over them (hence bolder revisions).  
 The profitability of a long/short trading strategy based on sorting by REVt also exhibits significant 
asymmetry across upward (REV+) and downward (REV-) revisions over the period of January 1983 to 
March 2008.  In REV+, the top quartile (P9) consistently outperforms the bottom quartile (P6) in the 
month after portfolio formation.  The one-month raw and various risk-adjusted return differences are 
economically and statistically significant at well over 100bp. The outperformance is robust to alternative 
definitions of REVt, characteristic-based benchmarks for estimating abnormal returns and longer holding 
periods. In particular, the return premium of high revision stocks among upward revisions lasts for at 
least 12 months and no return reversal is observed, suggesting this is likely driven by information rather 
than noise. Echoing early studies, we confirm that upward revisions are indeed informative. 
7 
On the contrary, in REV-, the differences in both raw return and Fama-French three factors adjusted 
return between the top quartile (P4) and the bottom quartile (P1) are not significantly different from zero 
in the one month after portfolio formation, indicating that the magnitude of downward revisions does not 
seem to convey much information. The differences in differences, (P9-P6) – (P4-P1), are significantly 
positive, suggesting upward revisions are significantly more informative. More importantly, after we 
further adjust for the momentum factor, the return difference (P4-P1) turned significantly negative at -
46bp.  Specifically, the Carhart four-factor adjusted return of P4 (least negative) is significantly negative 
at -30bp while that of P1 (most negative) is not significantly different from zero. It seems that when 
analysts are bold enough to heavily revise down a company’s earnings forecast, very likely they are 
simply stating the obvious that has already reflected in the past price movements. Therefore, while 
smaller negative revisions seem incrementally informative, larger downward revisions might not be. 
“Less is more; and more is not better” when it comes to analysts’ bad news revisions.  
We have been arguing that such asymmetric return predictability is driven by the underlying agency 
problem; but it might also be due to the systematic differences in firm characteristics between extreme 
and moderate revisions stocks observed earlier.  We rule out this alternative possibility with a series of 
Fama-Macbeth regressions and demonstrate that the asymmetry in the return explanatory power across 
REV+ and REV- is not subsumed by a host of well-documented return anomalies including size, growth, 
idiosyncratic risk, institutional holding, age and many other relevant firm characteristics.   
Moreover, if the “Less is more, more is not better” effect in bad news revisions is indeed driven by 
the underlying agency problem, it should be more pronounced among stocks that the conflicts are 
expected to be most severe. We conduct double sort tests on REVt and four firm characteristic variables 
that proxy for the degree of conflicts, size, turnover, analyst coverage and institutional holding. Indeed, 
we find that the good-bad asymmetry is more pronounced among bigger, more liquid stocks, more 
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heavily covered stocks and stocks with higher institutional holdings. This is because these firms tend to 
be banks’ important clients and trading in these stocks is likely the main source of sales commission 
revenues for analysts’ employers.  This finding lends strong support to our hypothesis that the observed 
differential informativeness in good and bad news revisions is driven by analyst agency problem. 
Finally, we take a more structural approach to cross-check our earlier results. Controlling for size, 
BM ratio and momentum, we regress three-month (RET3t, t+2) and six-month returns (RET6t, t+5), on 
REVt-1, a dummy variable BADt-1 that equals 1 if REVt-1 is negative and 0 if REVt-1 is positive and an 
interactive term between the two (BAD_REVt-1) in cross-section.  The time-series average coefficients of 
BADt-1 are significantly negative suggesting that the direction of downward revisions is informative. The 
average coefficients of REVt-1 are significantly positive while those of REV_BADt are significantly 
negative. The coefficients of REVt-1 and REV_BADt are of similar magnitude, indicating “More is indeed 
more” with good news while “More is not better” with bad news in analysts’ revisions. In augmented 
model specifications, we add, one by one, three three-way interactive terms defined as REV_BADt-1 
multiples firm characteristic variables. We consider three firm characteristic variables that proxy for the 
severity of conflicts of interest: SIZE, institutional holding (INST) and analyst coverage (NUMEST). As 
expected, the coefficients of these interaction terms are significantly negative, the “Less is more” effect 
is more pronounced among stocks that are particularly prone to the analyst agency problem. These 
findings agree with our double-sort results and together they help to disentangle our agency story from 
two competing explanations, 1) managers’ asymmetric disclosure behavior - managers release bad news 
less promptly (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009) and less precisely (Hutton, et al., 2003; Skinner, 1994), 
coupled with managers’ incentives to give analysts early access to positive inside information (Ivkovic 
& Jegadeesh, 2004); 2) “negative differentiation” - bad news might be systematically more complex and 
differentiated than good news (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). These two competing explanations cannot 
9 
explain why the asymmetry is more pronounced in bigger, more heavily covered stocks with higher 
institutional holding. The totality of our results supports our agency story and is less consistent with 
these competing explanations.  
Our paper contributes to the literature with a number of new findings. We provide evidence of a 
general asymmetry in the market’s reaction to the magnitude of analysts’ good and bad news forecast 
revisions that the information quality in analysts’ bad news revisions is inferior; we demonstrate that 
after controlling for momentum, extreme downward revisions contain little incremental information 
compared with moderate downward revisions – “Less is more and more is not better”. More importantly, 
we provide a compelling interpretation that is analysts systematically struggle with bad news reporting 
as conflicts are exacerbated with bad news but are attenuated with good news. We provide evidence that 
asymmetry is more pronounced among bigger, more heavily covered stocks and stocks with higher 
institutional holding – stocks typically are more prone to the analyst agency problem. Our findings 
reiterate that analyst forecasts, especially the bad news revisions, are colored by their incentives and 
may not be a clean measure of market earnings expectation. Also, analyst-revision-based stock ranking 
has been a popular technique used by investment managers. Traders and investors might be able to 
enhance their existing revision-based strategy by being more selective on informative revisions. Last but 
not least, our paper highlights the import of recent regulatory reforms on analyst behavior and suggests 
policies put particular emphasis on how analysts disseminate bad news. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literature and 
develop our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our data and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses 
our main empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Hypothesis Development and Related Literature 
Acting as agents on behalf of multiple principals including their employers, issuers, and investors 
(Fisch & Sale, 2002), analysts are more likely to be caught in the conflicts of interests when they have 
bad news to report. With good news, things are nice and easy. Analyst revises earnings forecast upwards 
according to her true expectation and thus investors’ interest is served; company is glad to see its share 
price responses favorably to analyst’s upward revision; and bank reaps higher sales commission from 
increased trading in the stock and enjoys better investment banking revenue prospect due to improved 
client relationship; all thanks to the bullish call of analyst who also expects to be rewarded accordingly. 
With good news, analysts can speak out more freely as economic incentives are well aligned.  
In contrast, tensions intensify when the going gets tough. Downward earnings forecast revisions can 
be devastating for analyst/bank’s relationship with the company, an important source of information for 
analyst and perhaps also an investment banking client for bank. Bearish calls do not help sales either 
because trading commissions are typically generated by institutional clients’ long transactions. While 
investors demand information as always, analysts struggle with negative reports. To report or not to 
report, and if yes, what and when to report might no longer be a straightforward function of analysts’ 
true views alone, but more of a complex decision that may also include many other often conflicting 
considerations. We hence hypothesize that such asymmetric behavior could potentially give rise to the 
loss of information in analysts’ downward forecast revisions, especially among stocks that conflicts are 
expected to be most severe, a classic agent cost.  
Surprisingly, there is only limited study examine specifically the question that whether analysts 
earnings forecast revisions are equally informative across good and bad news revisions.  Frankel et al. 
(2006) is a notable exception. They authors find that bad news analyst forecasts are more informative 
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than good news revisions. This is at odds with our prediction. There are three potential causes of this 
discrepancy. First, Frankel et al. (2006)’s good news (GNEWS5
Several other related papers however support our conjecture to varied degree. Conrad et al. (
) variable might be noisy as it solely 
depends on the relative frequency of upward vs. downward revisions within a year. It does not 
incorporate information in the size of each revision. Furthermore, averaging over one year also makes it 
hard to capture the sign of analysts’ reports timely. Second, their Analyst Informativeness (AI) measure 
might not adequately differentiate signal and noise. It resembles more a variance measure. AI is defined 
as the average absolute value of a firm’s stock one-day price reaction to analysts’ revisions in a given 
year.  Third, the short event window of price reaction does not incorporate the well-documented post-
revision price shift. Likely, the subsequent price shift in the same direction of the revision is driven by 
the same information in the original signal. On the other hand, in case any price reversal is observed post 
revision, the initial price reaction may be more noise than information.  
2006) 
find that following large stock price declines, analysts are more likely to downgrade stock 
recommendation as the price declines alleviate some pressure on analysts to withhold negative news. 
While following large stock price increases, they are equally likely to upgrade or downgrade. They 
attribute the asymmetry to “a stickiness in the downgrades that is the result of a conflict of interest.” 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) document that analysts tend to herd more for downgrades since they are 
typically reluctant to be negative on a stock. These findings support our claim that the asymmetric 
dynamics of analyst conflicts in good and bad news lead to asymmetric analyst behavior. Both papers 
however did not examine if similar asymmetry can also be found when analysts revise earnings forecasts. 
Gu and Xue (2008) find that when economic incentive misalignment is alleviated by analyst 
independence the marginal improvement in analyst earnings forecast informativeness is greater for bad 
                                                          
5 GNEWS is an indicator variable equals to one if the number of positive revision dates exceeds the number of negative revision dates in 
firm-year, and zero otherwise. 
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news. Jiang and Kim (2010) find that the incremental value of recommendation upgrades after positive 
stock price jumps is more pronounced than that of downgrades after negative jumps. The findings of 
these two papers lends further albeit indirect support to our argument that such asymmetric behavior 
could lead to potential loss of information. However these evidences alone do not necessarily prove that 
good news revisions are unconditionally more informative.  
Hong et al. (2000) demonstrate convincingly that bad news travels slowly as managers tend to 
withhold bad news (Kothari, et al., 2009). Our analyst agency story bode well with this finding as 
analysts’ reluctance to downgrade and/or downward revise could well be contributing to the sluggish 
diffusion of bad news. On the other hand, based on analysts’ information intermediary role, analysts 
could be likely to play a more significant role in the dissemination of bad news. This argument predicts 
greater informativeness in downward earnings forecast revisions, opposite to our prediction.  
Our hypothesis of the asymmetric market reaction to good and bad news analyst forecast revisions is 
based on analysts’ incentive structure. There are also competing explanations. First, it could be driven 
by managers’ asymmetric disclosure behavior.  Managers release bad news less promptly (Kothari, et al., 
2009) and less precisely (Hutton, et al., 2003; Skinner, 1994); managers have stronger incentives to give 
analysts early access to positive inside information (Ivkovic & Jegadeesh, 2004). Second, as “Happy 
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”, bad news might be 
systematically more complex and differentiated than good news; it could be due to the so-called 
“negative differentiation”6 Rozin & Royzman, 2001 ( ). In order to disentangle our agency story from the 
alternative interpretations, it is important to test if the asymmetry differs in different partitions of stocks,. 
Based on our agency story, such asymmetry should be more pronounced among stocks that conflicts are 
expected to be the most severe, e.g. bigger, more heavily covered stocks with higher institutional 
                                                          
6 Negative entities are more varied, yield more complex conceptual representations, and engage a wider response repertoire. 
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holdings. On the other hand, based on both alternative stories we do not expect to see greater asymmetry 
in these firms. It’s unlikely that managers of these more “established” and more closely “monitored” 
firms should behave worse. Bigger firms’ news, good or bad, might be generally more complex but it 
does not necessarily mean that differential complexity between good and bad news of these firms should 
also be greater.  
Given the ambiguous evidences, predictions and interpretations from past studies, we think the 
asymmetric price reaction after upward and downward revisions warrants closer scrutiny.  
3. Data and Methodology 
Our data come from three primary sources. The stock return and turnover data are from the CRSP 
Monthly Stocks Combined File, which includes NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Following 
literature, we only include common stocks, i.e. stocks with a CRSP share type code of 10 or 11. Analyst 
forecast data are from the I/B/E/S Forecast Historical Unadjusted Detailed File, and are available on a 
monthly basis from 1983. The accounting information is from Compustat.  Our sample period is January 
1983 to March 2008.  
3.1 Consensus Forecast Revisions (REV) 
Due to the precision problem related to stock-split adjustment in I/B/E/S standard Summary7
Payne & Thomas, 2003
 File 
( ), we replicate Summary File’s MEANEST statistic, the consensus forecasts, 
from I/B/E/S unadjusted individual forecasts. The lower precision in the adjusted data could potentially 
overstate the percentage of observations with zero revisions and lead to loss of information. Closely 
following the procedures suggested by WRDS, every third week of each month, we select individual 
                                                          
7 Our main results however remain qualitatively the same when we use the standard summary file. 
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forecasts pertain to the same firm and fiscal year one (FY1) from the Detailed File to be included in the 
sample used to compute the consensus forecast. These individual forecasts must also: (1) be issued 
within three months prior to consensus formation; (2) not be voided by I/B/E/S with an “Excluded” or 
“Stopped” flag; (3) be the latest estimate issued by a broker.  
We then calculate consensus revision (REVt) as the month-on-month change in consensus 
forecasts scaled by stock price in the last month. Stocks in the top and bottom 1% of the REVt variable in 
any given month are deleted to limit the effect of outliers8
INSERT TABLE [1]  
. Our revision sample is divided into two 
groups with REV+ containing upward revisions and REV- containing downward revisions. Within each 
group, each month, we sort stocks into quartiles from low to high based on REVt and form nine 
portfolios in total – four in REV- (P1-P4), four in REV+ (P6-P9) and one (P5) with zero revisions.  
Table 1 provides descriptive information on our sample revisions. Panel A reports various 
distributional statistic measures of revisions, as well as the percentage of upward, downward and zero 
revisions in each size deciles. Size deciles are defined based on AMEX/NYSE size breakpoint in any 
given month. Panel B and C report the same statistics by number of months to fiscal year-end and by 
momentum deciles. Four observations emerge from Table 1. (1) There are a large portion of zero 
revisions each month; (2) Revision distributions are generally skewed toward negative, consistent with 
the notion that analysts “walk down to beatable earnings expectations”. (3) Revisions are not evenly 
distributed over time, but are concentrated around reporting months. (4) The direction and magnitude of 
revisions are closely related to past price actions and thus might contain overlapping information.  
                                                          
8 All our results nevertheless remain significant and conclusions unchanged with the sample including the extremes. 
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3.2 Stock Characteristics and Autocorrelation across REV+ and REV- 
To provide some quick intuition, we first search for any systematic and/or asymmetric patterns in 
our revision sample.  We investigate REV’s association with various stock characteristics and report the 
properties of each of the nine (P1-P9) REV portfolios in Panel A of Table 2. We find that stocks which 
receive extreme revisions, upward or downward, tend to be younger, smaller, with lower price, less 
analyst coverage and institutional holding compared with moderate revisions stocks.  It appears that 
these stocks are inherently more volatile and/or analysts have more discretion over (hence bolder 
revisions). This finding raises a valid concern that some early studies might not have adequately 
adjusted for risk and characteristics that are now known to predict future returns.  Also, stocks in P5 
with zero revisions, i.e. those with no change in average analyst earning expectation, tend to be smaller, 
younger and neglected by analysts and institutional investors.  In most of the following analysis, we 
exclude stocks in P5.  
INSERT TABLE [2]  
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) points out that the consensus revision necessarily change 
gradually over time due to the lag between the first revision and the “followers” and find significant 
positive serial dependence in over 90% of the firms in their sample. We reckon that bad news would 
provide extra incentives, even for those capable ones, to lag their fellow analysts. Every year and for 
each stock, we separately estimate the upward autocorrelation (RhoUP) between positive REVt-1 and REVt 
and the downward autocorrelation (RhoDOWN) between negative REVt-1 and REVt, using a rolling window 
of four years. A minimum of 20 data points is required to estimate a meaningful correlation. The 
average RhoUP and RhoDOWN across all stocks from 1984 to 2005 are plotted in Panel A of Figure 1. 
Indeed, RhoDOWN appear to be clearly more positive than RhoUP, confirming the intuition that analysts 
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respond to bad news relatively more sluggishly. This finding is also consistent with Conrad et al. (2006) 
on analysts’ recommendation changes are “sticky” in one direction, with analysts reluctant to downgrade. 
The pressure to withhold bad news is not uniform across all stocks. It is likely that analysts may 
find more difficult to report bad news for stocks of larger firms, heavily covered firms with higher 
institutional holding and hence more pronounced asymmetry in auto-correlation. Each year we divide all 
stocks into two groups with heavy or light coverage based on the median number of analyst providing 
earnings estimates in June. Similarly, we also assign each stock to low- or high- institutional holding 
groups based on variable INST median and big or small groups based on AMEX/NYSE size median.  
Panel B, C and D of Figure 1 plot the time series average of the Spearman RhoUP and RhoDOWN by size, 
analyst coverage and institutional holding groups. Figure 1 confirms that the auto-correlation, especially 
RhoDOWN, is more positive in larger and heavily covered stocks and stocks with higher institutional 
holding, consistent with that analysts find it especially difficult to report bad news fully and timely when 
the involved company deem “important” for banks’ business.  
INSERT Figure [1]  
Past studies have also persistently documented a positive association between the sign and 
magnitude of analyst forecast revisions and those of prior stock returns, e.g. Brown, Foster and Noreen 
(1985) (BFN) and Givoly and Lakonishok (1979).  We observe an asymmetry across REV+ and REV- in 
this relationship. Panel A in Figure 2 plots the average past six-month cumulative stock returns of the 
eight portfolios in REV+ (P1-P4) and REV- (P6-P9), demonstrating that revision’s positive relation with 
momentum is visibly stronger in REV- than that in REV+.  Panel B shows an X/Y scatter plot of the 
average revisions vs. momentum for each revision class, where the larger downward revisions seem 
more closely correlated with past stock returns. Hwang, Li and Tong (2011) use one minus the 
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correlations between forecast revisions and prior stock returns (1-ρ) to proxy for production of private 
information and find that analysts with lower correlations are better information producers. Thus the 
visual evidences in Figure 2 have led us to conjecture that downward revisions might not contain as 
much incremental information beyond momentum as upward revisions do.  When analysts (heavily) 
revise down earnings forecast, it is more likely that, as BFN commented, “All they are doing is re-
expressing, in earnings forecast format, the information already available in publicly observable datum 
such as security price”.  
INSERT Figure [2]  
 To closely examine the revision-moment association in good and bad news and supplement the 
visual evidence, we run several Fama-Macbeth style regressions and report the time-series average of 
the coefficient and t-statistics in Panel B of Table 2.  In the first set of regressions, good or bad news is 
determined by if past stock return (MOM) outperform median. Regressions of REV on MOM are run 
among good and bad news stocks separately. We then pool the good and bad news stocks with an 
additional explanatory variable, an interactive term (MOM_BAD). In the second set of regressions, good 
or bad news is determined by the sign of revisions. Therefore, we regress MOM on REV in good and bad 
news stocks separately, and on REV and REV_BAD in pooled sample. In both sets of regressions, the 
coefficient of the interactive terms are significantly positive, indicating the positive association between 
momentum and revisions are significantly stronger when news is good than otherwise. 
The various asymmetric patterns observed are thus far encouraging and together they seem to 
suggest that quality of information especially that beyond momentum might differ across upward and 
downward revisions. As a quick confirmation to our conjecture, we examine an X/Y scatter plot of the 
average revisions vs. average subsequent 6-month cumulative stock returns for each of the nine revision 
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class as presented in Panel C and D of Figure 2. In Panel C, the Y axis denotes raw returns while in 
Panel D it denotes the excess returns adjusted by market return, size, BM ratio and momentum. As 
predicted, both charts exhibit apparent asymmetry. In REV+, there is a strong positive association 
between revision and future (both raw and excess) return. Yet no clear relationship is observable 
between revision and future raw return in REV-. Interestingly, after we adjust for stock characteristics 
including momentum, the revision and subsequent stock return relation is reversed at the extreme 
downward revision stocks, which seem to yield even slightly higher excess returns than those received 
moderate negative revisions. Though quick and dirty, this piece of visual evidence confirms our key 
predictions – the unconditional asymmetric informativeness across good and bad news revisions and the 
inferior quality of information in large vs. small downward revisions conditional on prior price actions.  
All the visual evidences provided in this section are important in shaping our hypothesis and they 
provide a preview of our main results. In the next section, we shall conduct various empirical tests to 
formally examine the association between revision and future stock returns. 
4. Consensus Revisions and Abnormal Returns 
In this section we formally test if the information quality of analysts’ downward revisions, 
particularly of those extreme ones, is inferior to that of upward revisions. We perform tests using single- 
and double-sort approaches as well as cross-sectional regressions. We also show that our empirical 
results are robust to alternative REV definitions, characteristic-based benchmarks for estimating 
abnormal returns and sub-periods checks. 
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4.1 Returns of Quartiles Sorted by Revisions  
In Table 4, we present the raw and excess returns of the nine REV portfolios (P1 – P9) in the one 
month, three and six months after portfolio formation throughout Panel A to C. We extend the holding 
periods beyond one month as market reaction to forecast revisions is slow and gradual. For example, for 
a three-month holding period strategy, each portfolio is held for 3 month so that in any given month 
there are effectively three cohorts of portfolio formed in the previous 3 months. We also show the 
returns of a zero-cost strategy that goes long P9 (P4) and goes short P6 (P1). Because REVt is auto-
correlated and our portfolios are overlapping for longer holding months, we correct the standard errors 
for auto-correlation using the Newey-West procedure9
INSERT TABLE [3]  
 with the number of lags equals to the number of 
months that the portfolios are held.   
We find that the profitability of a long/short trading strategy based on sorting by REV shows 
significant asymmetry across upward (REV+) and downward (REV-) revisions over the period of 
January 1983 to March 2008.  In REV+, both raw and abnormal returns pretty much monotonically 
increase across the REV quartiles. The top quartile (P9) outperforms the bottom quartile (P6) by 120bp 
in the first month after portfolio formation. After adjusted for market, size and book-to-market factors, 
we find that, stocks with the highest REV earn higher abnormal returns than stocks with the least REV 
in the first month post revision. The abnormal monthly return difference is significantly positive at 
100bp. When the Carhart four-factor adjustments are used, the return differences remain economically 
and statistically significant at 116bp.  Similar results are found when we extend the holding periods to 
three and six months. In un-tabulated tests, we find that the abnormal return difference between P9 and 
                                                          
9 The high auto-correlation tends to over-state the abnormal return and leads to erroneous conclusions (Ball, 1978). All t-
statistics in this paper are based on Newy-West standard errors. 
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P6 decrease as the holding periods extends, but they remain significant for at least 12 months with no 
sign of return reversal, suggesting this is likely driven by information rather than noise. Echoing earlier 
studies, we confirm that upward revisions are significantly informative. 
On the contrary, in REV-, the differences in both the raw returns and the Fama-French three factors 
adjusted returns between top quartile (P4) and the bottom quartile (P1) are not significantly different 
from zero in the month after portfolio formation, indicating that the magnitude of downward revisions 
does not seem to convey much information. Interestingly, after we further adjust for the momentum 
factor, the one-month return difference turned significantly negative at -46bp.  Specifically, the Carhart 
four-factor adjusted return of P4 (least negative) is significantly negative at -30bp while that of P1 (most 
negative) is not significantly different from zero. It seems that when analysts are bold enough to heavily 
revise down a company’s earnings forecast, very likely they are simply stating the obvious that has 
already reflected in the past price movements as large stock price declines alleviate some pressure on 
analysts to withhold negative news (Conrad, et al., 2006). Therefore, while smaller negative revisions 
are incrementally informative, extreme downward revisions might not be. “Less is more; and more is not 
better” when it comes to analysts’ bad news revisions. 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Return Predictability of REV and REV_BAD 
Our single sort tests show an inverse relationship between the magnitude of downward revision 
and price reaction after controlling for momentum, different from the positive relationship in upward 
revisions. But this evidence alone might not necessarily attest that such asymmetry is due to analyst 
agency problem. It could well be driven by the systematic differences in firm characteristics between 
extreme revisions stocks and those with moderate revisions. This is a valid concern as the absolute 
magnitude of revision is indeed correlated with various stock characteristics as shown in Table 2. 
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Therefore, in this subsection we conduct cross-sectional tests to investigate the asymmetry in excess 
return predicative power across REV+ and REV- more rigorously.  
To do so, we regress three-month cumulative stock return RET3 from month t to t+2 on one-
month lagged REVt-1, a dummy variable BADt-1 that equals 1 if REVt-1 is negative and 0 if REVt-1 is 
positive, and an interactive term between the two (REV_ BADt-1) along with various firm characteristic 
variables and conventional predictive variables for stock returns. NASDi is a dummy variable indicating 
if the stock of firm i is listed on NASDAQ. NASD_TOi is NASD dummy10
2008
 times firm turnover.  As 
suggested by previous studies, we also include number of analyst reporting (NUMESTi), share issuance 
(ISSUEi) as per Pontiff and Woodgate ( ), accruals (ACCRUi) as per Sloan (1996), number of years 
exist in CRSP (AGEi) and idiosyncratic risk (IVOLi). The regression is run each month and we report the 
average slope coefficients, intercepts, t-statistics and adjusted R2 in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE [4]  
Model (1) is our benchmark model specification. We consider lagged revision REVt-1 and 
REV_BADt-1 together with three conventional expected return explanatory variables, logarithm of market 
capitalization (SIZE) book-to-market (BM) and momentum (MOM). The signs of coefficients on BM 
and MOM are consistent with previous literature although the size effect is not significant in our sample 
partly because our sample tend to be over-represented by larger firms which attract analyst coverage. As 
expected, the coefficient of REVt-1 is significantly positive, and the coefficient of REV_BADt-1 is 
significantly negative and the two coefficients are of similar magnitude. Together these results indicate 
that “More is indeed more” with good news while “More is not better” with bad news in analysts’ 
                                                          
10 We also include the interactive term NASD_TO to allow for different coefficients on TO for stocks listed on NASDAQ due 
to the differences in market structure between NASDAQ and AMEX /NYSE as noted in Lee and Swaminathan (2000). 
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revisions.  While the magnitude of bad news revisions does not appear to be informative, the coefficients 
of BADt-1 are significantly negative indicating that their direction is nevertheless informative. 
Models (2) to (10) present a “horse race” by considering separate estimations for share issuance 
(ISSUE), turnover (TO), idiosyncratic risk (IVOL), age (AGE), accrual (ACCRU), analyst coverage 
(NUMEST) and institutional holding (INST). The slope coefficients of REVt-1 remain significantly 
positive while that of REV_BADt-1 remain significantly negative when these variables are added to our 
benchmark model (1) one by one. When a specification that includes all the above explanatory variables 
is considered in Model (11), the asymmetric pattern survives. Note that the sample size for Model (11) is 
necessarily much smaller due to data availability so we need to be cautious in interpreting the results 
from Model (11).  Overall, we interpret these results as supportive of our hypothesis that the information 
quality of analysts’ downward revisions is inferior.  The asymmetry in stock return predictive power 
across good and bad news revisions is not captured by various known risk factors, relevant firm 
characteristics or return anomalies.  
4.3 Returns of Quintiles Sorted by REV and Characteristics 
Intuitively, if the “Less is more, more is not better” effect is indeed driven by the underlying 
analyst agency problem, it should be more pronounced among stocks that are most prone to the conflicts 
of interests in the complex analyst principal-agent relationships. The agency problem is exacerbated 
among stocks over which analysts have less discretion. As argued earlier, analysts may find more 
difficult to report bad news for hot stocks (high turnover), stocks of larger firms, and heavily covered 
firms with high institutional holding. This is because these firms tend to be their important banking 
clients and/or trading in these stocks is likely the main source of sales commission revenues for analysts’ 
employers.  We therefore consider six firm characteristic variables: logarithm of year-end market 
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capitalization (SIZE), number of analysts reporting (NUMEST), institutional holding (INST), turnover 
(TO), idiosyncratic risks (IVOL), number of years exist in CRSP (AGE) and inverse of price (INVP) in 
our double sorts tests. 
Table 5 reports the raw and abnormal returns of stocks double-sorted by the above six 
characteristic variables and REV. Each month, we first sort stocks into 4 quartiles by characteristic, and 
then sort each characteristic-based quartile into two upward revisions portfolios based on REVt-1 from 
low to high (L+ and H+) and also two downward portfolios (L- and H-). The equal-weighted risk adjusted 
returns of each of these 16 (4 x 4) portfolios in the one month after portfolio formation and a trading 
strategy that go long on H+ (H-) and go short on L+ (L-) are then reported.   
INSERT TABLE [5]  
The results confirm our predictions. Asymmetry is more pronounced among larger stocks, more 
liquid stocks, stocks with higher institutional holdings and analyst coverage, and stocks with higher 
prices. For the upward revisions, all the excess return differences between H+ (more positive) and L+  
(less positive) are significantly positive across all four characteristic quartiles; however for the 
downward revisions, H- (less negative) generally do not outperform L- (more negative) after risk 
adjustments except for the quartile with smallest stocks and least covered stocks. Interestingly, after 
further controlling for momentum, H- (less negative) even significantly underperform L- among the 
largest stocks, stocks with the highest institutional holdings, the most heavily covered stocks, and stocks 
with higher price and turnover. Furthermore, although the monthly Fama-French three-factor adjusted 
return of extreme downward revision portfolios are generally significantly negative, after further 
adjusting for momentum they are not significantly different from zero except for the smallest and least 
covered stocks.  The momentum adjustment also reduces the moderate revision portfolios’ excess 
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returns which however generally remain significantly negative.  For example, the one-month Carhart 4 
factor adjusted return difference between H- (less negative) and L- (more negative) is significantly 
negative at -37bp among the largest quartile firms while it is significantly positive at 56bp among the 
smallest quartile.  Less is more and more is not better! 
Following Chan et al. (1996), we also perform double sorts by past returns and REV and summarize 
the results in Panel B.  We find that the post revision drift is driven by good news revisions and is much 
more pronounced among the winners; momentum profits after controlling for revisions are only 
significant among the good news revisions; the return difference between H- (less negative) and L- 
(more negative) is significantly negative among the extreme performers and not significantly different 
from zero among the average performers. These evidences are consistent with earlier evidences that 
downward revisions are closely correlated with past price whereas upward revisions are incrementally 
informative beyond momentum. Together these double-sort results paint a fairly consistent picture for 
our analyst asymmetry conjecture and lend strong support to our hypothesis that the observed 
differential informativeness in good news and bad news revisions is driven by analyst agency problem.  
4.4 Fama-Macbeth Regression with Three-Way Interactive Terms 
To supplement our double-sort test, we add a few interactive terms in our Fama-Macbeth cross-
section regression. Starting from the benchmark model specification (1) in Table 5, we add additional 
three-way interactive terms defined as BAD_REVt-1 times some firm characteristic variables such as 
SIZE, NUMEST and INST, which proxy for the severity of conflicts of interest. When we add a 
particular three-way interactive term, we also control for the relevant characteristic variable. We 
consider three dependent variables, RETt, RET3t,t+2 and RET6t,t+5.  
INSERT TABLE [6]  
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The regression results are summarized in Table 6. Consistent with earlier regression results in Table 
5, the coefficients of REVt-1 are still significantly positive and those of BAD t-1 remain significantly 
negative. However, the three-way interaction terms almost completely take away the return predictive 
power of REV_BAD. Particularly, when REV_BAD_INST and REV_BAD_SIZE are included in the 
regression, their coefficients are significantly negative while those of REV_BAD are no longer 
significantly different from zero. It seems that analysts’ reluctance and sluggishness to disclose bad 
news is closely dependent on the size of the firm and how important is the stock to the bank’s 
institutional holding. Therefore, “Less is more, more is not better” effect is more pronounced among 
those stocks that are particularly prone to the analyst agency problem.  
4.5 Robustness Tests with Alternative Definitions, in Sub-Periods and by Exchange  
In this subsection, we perform robustness tests to make sure that our results are not driven by data 
mining. First, we examine if the asymmetry still exists when alternative definitions of REV are used. 
Deflating the forecast revisions with last month’s price tend to penalize stocks with low price and/or 
stocks just experienced large price decline. We therefore repeat all the analysis in this paper with 
alternative definitions of REVt scaled by stock price at the last year-end, and by asset.  In Panel A of 
Table 7, we repeat the same single sort test with REV scaled by the last year-end’s stock price. In Panel 
B, we use an alternative definition of REV deflated by asset. The results remain qualitatively the same 
under both alternative REV definitions, suggesting that our results are not driven by the choices of 
denominators.  
INSERT TABLE [7]  
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Evaluating informativeness based on abnormal return post revision is always open to the criticism 
that the expected return benchmark used in measuring abnormal returns may be mis-specified (Fama, 
1998).  Using a characteristic-based benchmark to estimate the abnormal return we repeat the single sort 
test. Specifically, the characteristic-based benchmarks are constructed from the returns of 25 passive 
portfolios that are matched with stocks held in REV portfolio on the basis of the market capitalization, 
book-to-market, and prior-year return characteristics of those stocks (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, & 
Wermers, 1997). Similar results are found and we tabulated them in Panel C suggesting that our result is 
not sensitive to the benchmark model we use to adjust returns. 
INSERT TABLE [8]  
We also repeat the single sort test in 2 sub-periods (Table 8, Panel A). Asymmetry is significant 
in both sub-periods, especially in the second half of our sample period.  In Table 8 Panel B, we show the 
single sort test results by exchange and find that REV effect is present in both AMEX/NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks, perhaps more pronounced in NASDAQ stocks. 
5. Conclusion 
Our paper documents that the information quality in analysts’ bad news revisions is inferior. We 
demonstrate that, after controlling for momentum, extreme downward revisions contain little 
incremental information compared with moderate downward revisions – “Less is more and more is not 
better” when it comes to bad news. We provide evidence that such asymmetry is driven by analyst 
agency problem as the differential abnormal return predictive power is more pronounced among bigger, 
heavily covered stocks with higher institutional holding – stocks typically are more prone to the analyst 
agency problem.  
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Our paper could be interesting to researchers, practitioners and regulators.  It is a common empirical 
technique to use consensus forecast data to proxy for market expectations. Our study however reiterates 
again that analyst forecasts may not be a clean measure of expected earnings. The estimates issued by 
analysts may be colored by other incentives such as the desire to encourage investors to trade and hence 
generate brokerage commissions, and to maintain friendly relationship with company for access to 
information and/or future investment banking revenues. Analyst-revision-based stock ranking has been a 
popular technique used by investment managers. Traders and investors might be able to improve their 
existing revision-based strategy by being more selective on informative revisions.  
The conflict of interest issue has become the focus of intense debate in the financial press and 
several lawsuits in recent years. From the perspective of capital market efficiency, the misalignment of 
economic incentives that is at the root of analyst asymmetric behavior is an important source of loss of 
information.  Ideally, analysts ought to disclose their views fully and timely regardless the nature of their 
views. Our paper highlights the import of recent regulatory reforms on analyst behavior and suggests 
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Table 1: Revisions Summary Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for analyst consensus revisions for NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq common stocks during the period 
January 1983 to March 2008. Panel A reports the number of firms in each size decile, their mean and median size, the distribution of 
revisions including mean, standard deviation and various percentiles, as well as the percentage of upward, downward and zero revisions. 
Size deciles are defined based on AMEX/NYSE size breakpoint in any given month. Panel B reports the same statistics by number of 
months to fiscal year-end and Panel C reports by momentum deciles.  We exclude the extreme top and bottom 1% of the REV variable.  
 
SIZE 
Panel A: By AMEX/NYSE Size Deciles 
Firm No Mean  Size 
Median  







1 1431 15 13 -0.0010 0.0139 0.0575 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0690 0.18 0.65 0.17 
2 3546 44 38 -0.0013 0.0131 0.0580 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0693 0.28 0.49 0.23 
3 4604 108 88 -0.0011 0.0120 0.0579 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0693 0.34 0.36 0.29 
4 4464 218 171 -0.0009 0.0114 0.0580 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0693 0.38 0.28 0.34 
5 3731 363 299 -0.0007 0.0109 0.0580 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0692 0.41 0.22 0.37 
6 2997 579 489 -0.0005 0.0102 0.0580 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0694 0.44 0.16 0.40 
7 2268 967 849 -0.0004 0.0097 0.0580 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0692 0.45 0.12 0.43 
8 1641 1738 1504 -0.0002 0.0095 0.0580 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0692 0.47 0.08 0.44 
9 1115 3865 3144 -0.0000 0.0090 0.0579 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0691 0.49 0.05 0.46 
10 594 23283 11054 0.0001 0.0088 0.0578 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0691 0.48 0.03 0.49 
 
FYEM 
Panel B: By Months Fiscal Year-end 
Firm No Mean Size 
Median 







0 9010 2776 369 -0.0010 0.0083 0.0579 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0693 0.45 0.22 0.33 
1 9069 2672 373 -0.0010 0.0092 0.0580 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0691 0.41 0.23 0.36 
2 8661 2890 415 -0.0012 0.0113 0.0580 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0027 -0.0691 0.49 0.10 0.41 
3 8751 2917 406 -0.0014 0.0087 0.0579 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0692 0.47 0.22 0.31 
4 8785 2826 409 -0.0011 0.0095 0.0578 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0693 0.42 0.23 0.35 
5 8451 3056 459 -0.0016 0.0112 0.0580 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0029 -0.0693 0.47 0.11 0.42 
6 8506 3066 445 -0.0014 0.0091 0.0574 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0016 -0.0690 0.44 0.22 0.33 
7 8536 2957 444 -0.0007 0.0097 0.0580 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0692 0.39 0.23 0.38 
8 8280 3133 481 -0.0006 0.0112 0.0580 0.0017 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0693 0.43 0.14 0.43 
9 8449 3264 501 0.0008 0.0115 0.0580 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0692 0.38 0.21 0.41 
10 8060 3465 530 0.0050 0.0155 0.0580 0.0114 0.0035 0.0000 -0.0694 0.25 0.13 0.63 
11 8604 3328 456 -0.0007 0.0094 0.0580 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0692 0.44 0.19 0.37 
 
MOM 
Panel C: By Momentum 
Firm No Mean  Size 
Median  







1 7476 1270 225 -0.0043 0.0150 0.0580 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0068 -0.0693 0.52 0.23 0.25 
2 7952 2365 350 -0.0021 0.0116 0.0580 0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0035 -0.0693 0.51 0.19 0.31 
3 7888 3121 462 -0.0011 0.0102 0.0579 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0022 -0.0692 0.48 0.19 0.34 
4 7569 3733 564 -0.0006 0.0096 0.0580 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0017 -0.0692 0.46 0.18 0.36 
5 7414 4045 630 -0.0003 0.0091 0.0580 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0691 0.44 0.17 0.39 
6 7310 4060 663 0.0002 0.0090 0.0580 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0693 0.41 0.17 0.41 
7 7284 4002 653 0.0003 0.0091 0.0579 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0693 0.39 0.17 0.43 
8 7317 3695 585 0.0006 0.0095 0.0579 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0694 0.37 0.17 0.45 
9 7385 2973 461 0.0007 0.0094 0.0580 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0692 0.35 0.18 0.47 
10 7054 1446 249 0.0013 0.0102 0.0580 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0689 0.31 0.21 0.49 
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Table 2: Revisions and Firm Characteristics, Momentum 
This table summarizes the univariate statistics for the firm characteristic variables of our nine groups of firms sorted by revision (REV). 
REV is measured by the month-on-month change in analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. The variables used are defined as follows. 
NUMEST is the number of analysts that provide earning forecasts. BM is the book-to-market ratio at year-end. PROFIT is the Operating 
Margin defined as EBIDA/sales and ROE is Operating Income after Depreciation divided by Book Equity. ACCRU is the accrual 
component of earning as per Sloan (1996). SIZE is the logarithm of a firm’s year-end market value. TO is a firm’s turnover defined as the 
prior six months’ trading volume divided by shares outstanding. INST is institutional holding and idiosyncratic risk (IVOL) is computed 
based on Fama-French 3 factor model with daily returns in the previous month. DISP is analyst forecast dispersion defined as the standard 
deviation of individual analyst forecasts used to estimate consensus forecast scaled by stock price. INVP is the inverse of price. CADJFAC 
is the cumulative adjustment factor for stock split. Our sample period is January 1983 to March 2008.  
 
Panel A: Revisions and Firm Characteristics 
Rank REV MOM SIZE BM AGE TO MED ERROR ROE ACCRU INVP DISP IVOL NUMEST CADJFAC INST 
1 -0.0208 -0.0312 1996 0.79 15 0.1480 1.0093 0.40 -0.0334 0.1119 0.0161 0.0200 4 1.84 0.46 
2 -0.0047 0.0210 2578 0.72 17 0.1350 0.6858 0.28 -0.0307 0.0733 0.0090 0.0172 5 2.02 0.50 
3 -0.0015 0.0563 3568 0.66 19 0.1283 0.3954 0.22 -0.0293 0.0549 0.0054 0.0155 5 2.18 0.53 
4 -0.0004 0.0977 6145 0.55 20 0.1306 0.2380 0.26 -0.0272 0.0405 0.0036 0.0147 6 2.45 0.56 
5 0.0000 0.0789 913 0.73 13 0.1122 0.5813 0.23 -0.0317 0.1222 0.0078 0.0200 2 1.71 0.41 
6 0.0003 0.1352 6738 0.53 20 0.1387 0.1872 0.26 -0.0290 0.0390 0.0038 0.0145 6 2.48 0.57 
7 0.0016 0.1408 4171 0.63 19 0.1344 0.2950 0.21 -0.0330 0.0486 0.0053 0.0150 5 2.30 0.54 
8 0.0046 0.1446 3361 0.69 18 0.1369 0.3895 0.32 -0.0366 0.0596 0.0096 0.0160 5 2.27 0.51 
9 0.0177 0.1416 2701 0.72 16 0.1446 0.6747 0.22 -0.0427 0.0832 0.0208 0.0177 4 2.36 0.47 
 
Panel B: Revisions and Momentum 
 
Y = REV Good/Bad news based on MOM  Y = MOM Good/Bad news based on REV 
Var Good Bad All All  Var Good Bad All All 
Intercept 0.000* -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000*  Intercept 0.143*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.105*** 
 (1.92) (-1.41) (-6.51) (-1.85)   (13.52) (7.07) (7.07) (10.15) 
MOM 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.002***  REV -0.425 4.008*** 4.008*** 1.592*** 
 (12.03) (24.33) (20.58) (14.42)   (-1.52) (18.95) (18.95) (6) 
MOM_BAD    0.008***  REV_BAD    3.833*** 
    (20.28)      (8.84) 
SAMPLE 268334 267010 535344 535344  SAMPLE 208557 227260 227260 435817 
ADJRSQ 0.0030 0.0211 0.0197 0.0262  ADJRSQ 0.0062 0.0311 0.0311 0.0343 
  
32 
Table 3: Single Sort on Revisions 
 
This table presents average monthly raw returns and excess returns for stocks in ten deciles sorted by REV. Each month, we divide our 
sample of firms t into four REV+ classes from low to high, with P1 representing the most negative REV quartile and with P4 representing 
the least and four REV+ classes, with P6 representing the least positive REV quartile and with P9 representing the most. REV is measured 
by the month-on-month change in analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. In Panel A, we report the equal-weighted average monthly 
returns of the eight REV portfolios in the one month post revision. We also report the returns of two zero-cost trading strategies (P4-P1) 
that goes long P4 and short P1, and (P9-P6) that goes long P9 and short P6. Return differences in these two long/short strategies (difference 
in difference, or DID) are also reported in the last column. Excessive returns are computed based on CAPM, Fama-French 3-Factor Model 
and Carhart 4-Factor Model. T-statistics based on Newy-West standard errors with 1 lag are reported below the returns in brackets. In 
Panel B and Panel C, we report the same statistics with three-month and six-month holding periods. T-statistics based on Newy-West 
standard errors are reported below the returns in brackets.  The number of lags used in Newy-West adjustment equals to the number of 
months the portfolio are held for. Our sample period is January 1983 to March 2008. 
Panel A: Holding for 1 Mont
 
h 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0105*** 0.0084** 0.0079** 0.0075**  -0.0029  0.0092*** 0.0124*** 0.0154*** 0.0212***  0.0120***  0.0107***  0.0149*** 
 (2.63) (2.45) (2.5) (2.52)  (-1.58)  (3.13) (4.11) (4.82) (5.85)  (7.86)  (8.08)  (4.81) 
CAPM -0.0014 -0.0027* -0.0028** -0.0031***  -0.0017  -0.0014 0.0017* 0.0045*** 0.0097***  0.0111***  0.0111***  0.0128*** 
 (-0.67) (-1.67) (-2.07) (-2.9)  (-1.03)  (-1.36) (1.72) (3.51) (5.93)  (7.71)  (8.7)  (4.58) 
FF3F -0.0024 -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0037***  -0.0012  -0.0016 0.0013 0.0035*** 0.0084***  0.0100***  0.0108***  0.0112*** 
 (-1.46) (-3.41) (-3.77) (-4.34)  (-0.72)  (-1.64) (1.59) (3.78) (7.6)  (7.65)  (7.94)  (4.17) 
CAR4 0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0020** -0.0030***  -0.0046***  -0.0017 0.0016** 0.0046*** 0.0099***  0.0116***  0.0083***  0.0162*** 
 (1.19) (-1.34) (-2.26) (-3.34)  (-2.66)  (-1.61) (1.98) (5.14) (9.07)  (7.66)  (6.34)  (5.48) 
Panel B: Holding for 3 month
 
s 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0102*** 0.0088*** 0.0086*** 0.0082***  -0.0020  0.0093*** 0.0113*** 0.0145*** 0.0197***  0.0104***  0.0095***  0.0124*** 
 (2.68) (2.67) (2.91) (2.88)  (-1.16)  (3.29) (3.9) (4.74) (5.63)  (7.46)  (8.41)  (4.19) 
CAPM -0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0025**  -0.0009  -0.0014 0.0006 0.0035*** 0.0082***  0.0095***  0.0097***  0.0104*** 
 (-0.74) (-1.32) (-1.49) (-2.35)  (-0.58)  (-1.38) (0.54) (2.73) (4.94)  (7.1)  (9.06)  (3.81) 
FF3F -0.0027* -0.0038*** -0.0033*** -0.0030***  -0.0003  -0.0015 0.0000 0.0025*** 0.0070***  0.0085***  0.0097***  0.0088*** 
 (-1.77) (-3.4) (-3.4) (-3.49)  (-0.23)  (-1.63) (0.05) (3.17) (7.09)  (6.78)  (8.15)  (3.6) 
CAR4 0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0013* -0.0021**  -0.0034**  -0.0011 0.0007 0.0036*** 0.0083***  0.0094***  0.0070***  0.0128*** 
 (1.14) (-1.38) (-1.74) (-2.52)  (-2.34)  (-1.21) (0.92) (4.67) (7.95)  (6.96)  (7)  (4.9) 
 
 
Panel C: Holding for 6 months 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0114*** 0.0099*** 0.0093*** 0.0086***  -0.0028*  0.0094*** 0.0111*** 0.0136*** 0.0174***  0.0080***  0.0060***  0.0108*** 
 (3.39) (3.45) (3.57) (3.48)  (-1.66)  (3.72) (4.33) (4.96) (5.48)  (6.22)  (6.79)  (3.74) 
CAPM -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0020*  -0.0017  -0.0013 0.0004 0.0026** 0.0059***  0.0072***  0.0062***  0.0089*** 
 (-0.12) (-0.68) (-0.93) (-1.71)  (-1.11)  (-1.24) (0.37) (2.01) (3.51)  (5.76)  (7.47)  (3.29) 
FF3F -0.0016 -0.0027** -0.0027*** -0.0026***  -0.0010  -0.0015* -0.0003 0.0015* 0.0047***  0.0063***  0.0063***  0.0073*** 
 (-1.19) (-2.46) (-2.74) (-2.77)  (-0.74)  (-1.66) (-0.34) (1.94) (5.32)  (5.58)  (7.33)  (3.08) 
CAR4 0.0022* -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0014  -0.0036**  -0.0007 0.0006 0.0026*** 0.0060***  0.0067***  0.0038***  0.0103*** 
 (1.89) (-0.11) (-0.76) (-1.61)  (-2.57)  (-0.84) (0.77) (3.77) (6.17)  (5.74)  (5.51)  (4.16) 
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Table 4: Fama-Macbeth Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions results are computed for stock returns on the following variables: revision at t-1 (REVt-1), 
defined as the month-on-month change in analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts; the natural logarithm of market equity measured at year-
end (SIZE); book-to-market ratio measured at year-end (BM); cumulative returns in the past six months (MOM); equity issuance (ISSUE) 
as per Pontiff and Woodgate (2008); turnover (TO); turnover times Nasdaq dummy (NASD_TO); accrual (ACCRU) as per Sloan (1996); 
institutional holding (INST); and idiosyncratic risk (IVOL) is computed based on Fama-French 3 factor model with daily returns in the 
previous month. The dependent variable is three-month cumulative return (RET3) from t to t+2. The ADJSQR is the average of the 
adjusted R2 obtained from the cross-sectional regressions. The results presented in the table are the regression coefficients and the t-
statistics based on Newy-West standard errors in brackets. Theses regressions are for the 299 months from March 1983 to March 2008. 
 
VAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Intercept 0.028* 0.034** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.031* 0.034*** 0.033** 0.031** 0.042*** 0.029* 0.057*** 
 (1.84) (2.25) (2.03) (3.11) (1.97) (2.7) (2.36) (2.1) (3.93) (1.85) (4.51) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.16) (0.47) (-0.21) (0.05) (-0.69) (-0.15) (-0.62) (-0.23) (-0.31) 
BM 0.006** 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.005* 0.003 
 (1.98) (1.98) (1.83) (1.7) (1.76) (2.01) (1.84) (1.77) (1.69) (1.72) (1.09) 
MOM 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.009 0.021*** 0.010 
 (4.09) (3.57) (3.64) (3.44) (3.69) (4.01) (3.73) (3.6) (1.21) (3.16) (1.4) 
REV 0.236*** 0.152*** 0.478*** 0.556*** 0.475*** 0.468*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.576*** 0.490*** 0.529*** 
 (5.31) (3.47) (5.67) (5.8) (5.72) (5.58) (5.54) (5.71) (7.28) (5.54) (5.2) 
BAD  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.006*** 
  (-7.35) (-7.07) (-6.78) (-7.13) (-7.92) (-7.47) (-7.2) (-5.92) (-6.54) (-4.48) 
REV_BAD   -0.557*** -0.696*** -0.552*** -0.569*** -0.555*** -0.558*** -0.569*** -0.631*** -0.573*** 
   (-4.4) (-4.51) (-4.46) (-4.54) (-4.3) (-4.45) (-5.07) (-4.79) (-3.58) 
INST    -0.033***       -0.036*** 
    (-6.56)       (-7.81) 
NUMEST     0.000      -0.000 
     (0.79)      (-0.02) 
TO      -0.072***     0.025 
      (-3.27)     (1.13) 
NASD_TO      0.029     -0.085 
      (1.61)     (-1.5) 
AGE       0.000    0.000 
       (1.34)    (1.02) 
ISSUE        -0.010***   -0.017*** 
        (-4.31)   (-3.75) 
IVOL         -0.575***  -0.432*** 
         (-3.06)  (-2.87) 
ACCRU          -0.070*** -0.060*** 
          (-5.9) (-3.86) 
SAMPLE 350618 350618 350618 255703 350618 350618 350618 350618 211202 278177 128368 




 Table 5: Double Sorts on Revisions 
 
This table presents the raw returns and excess returns of the REV portfolios for subsamples of firms sorted on seven firm characteristic 
variables: SIZE, INST, NUMEST, INVP, AGE and DISP. SIZE is the logarithm of a firm’s year-end market value; NUMEST is the 
number of analysts that provide earning forecasts; INST is institutional holding; INVP is the inverse of price; AGE is number of years exist 
in CRSP; IVOL is idiosyncratic risk; and DISP is analyst dispersion defined as the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts. Each 
month, we divide our sample of firms into four classes based on the above six variables. We report The equal-weighted risk adjusted 
returns of each of these 16 (4 x 4) portfolios in the first month after portfolio formation and a trading strategy that buy H+ (H-) and sell L+ 
(L-) as well as the difference in differences within each characteristic quartile. We then sort each quartile of stocks into two upward 
revisions portfolios based on REVt-1 from low to high (L+ and H+) and also two downward portfolios (L- and H-). We report their excess 
returns based on Fama-French 3-Factor and Carhart 4-Factor model, along with the Newy-West adjusted t-statistics in brackets. Our sample 
period is January 1976 to March 2008.  Panel B reports the two-way classification on Revisions and momentum. 
 
 
Panel A: Two-Way Classification on Revisions and Stock Characteristics 
   REV< 0        REV > 0     
  FF3F    CAR4    FF3F    CAR4  
 L
- H- H-- L-  L- H- H-- L-  L+ H+ H+- L+  L+ H+ H+- L- 
 SIZE               
1 -0.0114*** -0.0038** 0.0076***  -0.0086*** -0.0030 0.0056**  0.0079*** 0.0158*** 0.0079***  0.0084*** 0.0170*** 0.0086*** 
Small (-4.81) (-2) (3.39)  (-3.72) (-1.51) (2.54)  (3.71) (6.69) (3.13)  (3.78) (7.22) (3.5) 
2 -0.0050*** -0.0064*** -0.0014  -0.0017 -0.0052*** -0.0035*  0.0007 0.0074*** 0.0067***  0.0009 0.0092*** 0.0083*** 
 (-3.14) (-5.13) (-0.85)  (-1.2) (-4.03) (-1.9)  (0.48) (4.73) (3.81)  (0.6) (6.09) (4.32) 
3 -0.0028 -0.0033*** -0.0005  0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0028  -0.0016 0.0045*** 0.0060***  -0.0015 0.0061*** 0.0076*** 
 (-1.62) (-2.76) (-0.32)  (0.6) (-1.64) (-1.63)  (-1.45) (3.63) (4.42)  (-1.26) (4.94) (4.85) 
4 -0.0011 -0.0026*** -0.0014  0.0023** -0.0014* -0.0037***  -0.0008 0.0031*** 0.0039***  -0.0007 0.0037*** 0.0044*** 
Large (-0.77) (-3.01) (-1.13)  (1.97) (-1.81) (-2.88)  (-0.94) (3.93) (3.75)  (-0.9) (4.73) (4.2) 
 INST               
1 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0014  0.0026 0.0011 -0.0015  0.0057*** 0.0124*** 0.0067***  0.0059*** 0.0137*** 0.0078*** 
Low (-0.53) (0.3) (0.7)  (1.01) (0.9) (-0.57)  (4.57) (8.36) (3.73)  (4.63) (8.29) (4.01) 
2 -0.0032** -0.0010 0.0022  -0.0002 0.0005 0.0007  0.0023** 0.0089*** 0.0065***  0.0020* 0.0098*** 0.0078*** 
 (-2.15) (-0.91) (1.4)  (-0.17) (0.43) (0.46)  (2.34) (7.02) (4.33)  (1.84) (7.24) (4.67) 
3 -0.0034** -0.0036*** -0.0002  -0.0001 -0.0023** -0.0022*  0.0002 0.0045*** 0.0043***  0.0006 0.0050*** 0.0044*** 
 (-2.16) (-3.18) (-0.17)  (-0.11) (-2.15) (-1.67)  (0.18) (3.67) (3.3)  (0.48) (3.79) (3.44) 
4 -0.0046** -0.0081*** -0.0034**  -0.0013 -0.0064*** -0.0051***  -0.0050*** -0.0014 0.0036***  -0.0048*** -0.0004 0.0043*** 
High (-2.55) (-5.83) (-2.42)  (-0.84) (-5.16) (-3.62)  (-3.56) (-1.08) (3.01)  (-3.59) (-0.38) (3.55) 
 NUMEST               
1 -0.0078*** -0.0025** 0.0052***  -0.0052*** -0.0018 0.0034*  -0.0007 0.0076*** 0.0083***  -0.0005 0.0095*** 0.0100*** 
Light (-4.74) (-2.08) (2.99)  (-3.07) (-1.46) (1.77)  (-0.48) (5.14) (4.32)  (-0.37) (5.51) (4.15) 
2 -0.0038*** -0.0040*** -0.0002  -0.0010 -0.0032** -0.0022  0.0010 0.0060*** 0.0050***  0.0009 0.0083*** 0.0074*** 
 (-2.73) (-3.45) (-0.13)  (-0.83) (-2.51) (-1.24)  (0.83) (3.95) (3.08)  (0.74) (5.32) (3.64) 
3 -0.0029** -0.0035*** -0.0006  0.0004 -0.0022* -0.0026*  -0.0005 0.0067*** 0.0072***  -0.0007 0.0078*** 0.0085*** 
 (-1.99) (-3.16) (-0.46)  (0.38) (-1.95) (-1.84)  (-0.42) (6.19) (5.53)  (-0.56) (6.99) (5.99) 
4 -0.0022 -0.0041*** -0.0019  0.0020 -0.0024** -0.0044***  -0.0009 0.0039*** 0.0048***  -0.0003 0.0041*** 0.0044*** 
Heavy (-1.2) (-3.76) (-1.39)  (1.47) (-2.48) (-3.51)  (-0.92) (3.55) (3.92)  (-0.32) (3.11) (2.89) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 TO               
1 -0.0037*** -0.0020* 0.0017  -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0000  0.0005 0.0062*** 0.0058***  0.0005 0.0073*** 0.0067*** 
Low (-2.91) (-1.68) (1.46)  (-1.28) (-1.1) (0)  (0.39) (4.83) (4.77)  (0.42) (5.81) (5.08) 
2 -0.0046*** -0.0023** 0.0023*  -0.0019** -0.0013 0.0006  0.0002 0.0059*** 0.0057***  0.0002 0.0073*** 0.0071*** 
 (-3.64) (-2.16) (1.94)  (-2.04) (-1.26) (0.54)  (0.15) (4.91) (4.31)  (0.17) (6.1) (5.05) 
3 -0.0034** -0.0040*** -0.0006  0.0004 -0.0027** -0.0031**  -0.0014 0.0037*** 0.0050***  -0.0010 0.0051*** 0.0061*** 
 (-2.12) (-3.39) (-0.41)  (0.36) (-2.48) (-2.09)  (-1.2) (2.99) (3.98)  (-0.82) (4.59) (4.68) 
4 -0.0016 -0.0061*** -0.0045**  0.0027 -0.0040** -0.0067***  -0.0001 0.0070*** 0.0071***  0.0002 0.0082*** 0.0080*** 
High (-0.71) (-3.74) (-2.53)  (1.24) (-2.48) (-3.35)  (-0.09) (3.94) (3.83)  (0.12) (4.31) (3.6) 
 AGE               
1 -0.0050** -0.0066*** -0.0016  0.0000 -0.0047*** -0.0047*  -0.0023 0.0078*** 0.0102***  -0.0018 0.0107*** 0.0125*** 
Young (-2.16) (-4.79) (-0.74)  (0) (-3.32) (-1.68)  (-1.5) (4.38) (4.89)  (-1.21) (5.2) (4.8) 
2 -0.0042*** -0.0039*** 0.0003  -0.0011 -0.0024** -0.0013  0.0001 0.0075*** 0.0074***  0.0004 0.0088*** 0.0084*** 
 (-2.9) (-3.26) (0.25)  (-0.94) (-2.22) (-1.07)  (0.09) (5.83) (4.95)  (0.29) (7) (5.19) 
3 -0.0022 -0.0033*** -0.0011  0.0011 -0.0020** -0.0030**  0.0014 0.0054*** 0.0041***  0.0014 0.0061*** 0.0047*** 
 (-1.53) (-3.25) (-0.92)  (0.9) (-2.1) (-2.39)  (1.51) (5.56) (3.69)  (1.49) (6.03) (4.1) 
4 -0.0023* -0.0024** -0.0001  0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0017*  -0.0001 0.0023** 0.0024**  -0.0002 0.0022** 0.0024** 
Old (-1.84) (-2.43) (-0.07)  (0.06) (-1.64) (-1.69)  (-0.08) (2.48) (2.35)  (-0.21) (2.24) (2.36) 
 INVP               
1 0.0010 -0.0034*** -0.0044***  0.0002 -0.0045*** -0.0047***  -0.0008 0.0060*** 0.0068***  -0.0021** 0.0037*** 0.0058*** 
High (1) (-3.42) (-3.97)  (0.22) (-4.66) (-4.24)  (-0.87) (5.33) (5.31)  (-2.14) (3.67) (5.12) 
2 -0.0018* -0.0039*** -0.0021*  -0.0007 -0.0029** -0.0021*  -0.0007 0.0036*** 0.0044***  -0.0008 0.0034*** 0.0043*** 
 (-1.88) (-3.49) (-1.77)  (-0.8) (-2.58) (-1.9)  (-0.6) (3.55) (3.9)  (-0.67) (3.27) (3.81) 
3 -0.0061*** -0.0041** 0.0019  -0.0027** -0.0007 0.0020  0.0011 0.0071*** 0.0061***  0.0031** 0.0089*** 0.0058*** 
 (-3.87) (-2.51) (1.56)  (-2.4) (-0.51) (1.41)  (0.67) (4.94) (4.58)  (2.05) (6.55) (4.07) 
4 -0.0057** -0.0048** 0.0009  0.0009 0.0009 0.0000  0.0004 0.0064** 0.0060***  0.0059** 0.0118*** 0.0059*** 
Low (-2.11) (-1.97) (0.57)  (0.4) (0.47) (0)  (0.17) (2.47) (3.17)  (2.52) (4.49) (2.69) 
 
 
Panel B: Two-Way Classification on Revisions and Momentum 
  REV<0        REV>0     
  CAPM    FF3F    CAMP    FF3F  
 L- H- H-- L-  L- H- H-- L-  L+ H+ H+- L+  L+ H+ H+- L- 
1 -0.0039 -0.0075*** -0.0035**  -0.0046 -0.0075*** -0.0029*  -0.0052** -0.0002 0.0050***  -0.0040 0.0000 0.0040** 
Loser (-1.34) (-3.28) (-2.14)  (-1.49) (-3.15) (-1.79)  (-2.18) (-0.06) (2.91)  (-1.61) (0) (2.43) 
2 -0.0011 -0.0004 0.0007  -0.0037** -0.0022* 0.0014  0.0016 0.0053*** 0.0037***  0.0005 0.0032** 0.0027** 
 (-0.63) (-0.28) (0.67)  (-2.49) (-1.76) (1.5)  (1.27) (3.59) (2.93)  (0.36) (2.34) (2.2) 
3 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0005  -0.0041*** -0.0039*** 0.0002  0.0008 0.0070*** 0.0062***  -0.0006 0.0045*** 0.0050*** 
 (-0.97) (-1.44) (-0.46)  (-4.21) (-3.59) (0.16)  (0.67) (5.19) (5.55)  (-0.51) (4.47) (4.45) 
4 0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0038***  0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0034**  0.0016 0.0117*** 0.0101***  0.0021* 0.0115*** 0.0093*** 
Winner (0.62) (-1.22) (-2.78)  (0.97) (-1.08) (-2.3)  (0.98) (5.68) (7.33)  (1.73) (7.42) (6.72) 
W-L 0.0053 0.0051 -0.0003  0.0062 0.0057 -0.0004  0.0068** 0.0119*** 0.0051**  0.0062* 0.0115*** 0.0053** 
 (1.58) (1.62) (-0.14)  (1.53) (1.63) (-0.22)  (2.22) (3.49) (2.44)  (1.92) (2.82) (2.45) 
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Table 6: Fama-Macbeth Regressions with Interactive Terms 
 
We regress one-month return (RETt), three-month (RET3t, t+2) and six-month cumulative returns (RET6t, t+5), on REVt-1, a dummy variable 
(BADt-1) that equals 1 if REVt-1 is negative and 0 if REVt-1 is positive and an interactive term between the two (BAD_REVt-1) controlling for 
size, book to market ratio and momentum.  Starting from the benchmark model specification (1) in Table 5, we add additional three-way 
interactive terms defined as BAD_REVt-1 times three firm characteristic variables SIZE, NUMEST and INST.  
 
 Y = RET Y = RET3 Y = RET6 
Var (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.014** 0.017*** 0.012* 0.033** 0.046*** 0.032** 0.067** 0.097*** 0.070** 
 (2.17) (2.85) (1.8) (2.24) (3.23) (2.02) (2.29) (3.23) (2.24) 
SIZE -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 
 (-0.7) (0.07) (0.11) (-0.55) (0.45) (-0.22) (-0.66) (-0.04) (-0.81) 
BM 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.011 0.012 0.011 
 (1.37) (1.09) (1.34) (1.84) (1.69) (1.75) (1.45) (1.48) (1.35) 
MOM 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 
 (0.3) (0.12) (0.27) (3.67) (3.45) (3.72) (4.71) (4.42) (4.83) 
REV 0.144*** 0.177*** 0.146*** 0.472*** 0.554*** 0.474*** 0.943*** 1.126*** 0.931*** 
 (4.17) (4.15) (4.25) (5.58) (5.72) (5.68) (4.84) (5.41) (4.87) 
BAD -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (-8.37) (-8.54) (-8.21) (-7.61) (-7.12) (-7.45) (-3.69) (-4.22) (-3.78) 
REV_BAD 0.129 -0.033 -0.054 0.230 -0.252 -0.404*** -0.363 -1.482* -1.192*** 
 (1.42) (-0.38) (-1.09) (0.92) (-0.9) (-2.95) (-0.46) (-1.83) (-2.78) 
REV_BAD_SIZE -0.047***   -0.145***   -0.202**   
 (-3.41)   (-4.07)   (-1.98)   
REV_BAD _INST  -0.358***   -1.126***   -1.388  
  (-2.92)   (-2.93)   (-1.64)  
INST  -0.009***   -0.037***   -0.072***  
  (-4.15)   (-7.21)   (-6.61)  
REV_BAD _ANALYST   -0.023***   -0.036***   -0.060* 
   (-3.84)   (-2.93)   (-1.8) 
NUMEST   -0.000   0.000   0.001 
   (-1.51)   (0.28)   (1.6) 
SAMPLE 419394 305190 419394 350618 255703 350618 289125 211280 289125 





Table 7:  Single Sort on REV by Alternative Definition and Risk Models 
Table 7 present the equal-weighted average monthly returns of the stocks in eight portfolios sorted based on alternative definitions of REV 
with a holding period of 1 month.  We also report the returns of two zero-cost trading strategies (P4-P1) and (P9-P6) that goes long P4 (P9) 
and short P1 (P6). Excessive returns are computed based on CAPM, Fama-French 3-Factor Model and Carhart 4-Factor Model. T-statistics 
based on Newy-West standard errors with 6 lags are reported below the returns in brackets. Panel A uses REV scaled by the last year-end’s 
stock price. In Panel B, we use an alternative definition of REV deflated by asset. Panel C uses a characteristic-based benchmark to 
estimate the abnormal return we repeat the single sort test and find similar results as tabulated in. Specifically, the benchmarks are 
constructed from the returns of 25 passive portfolios that are matched with stocks held in REV portfolio on the basis of the market 
capitalization, book-to-market, and prior-year return characteristics of those stocks. Our sample period is January 1983 to March 2008. 
Panel A: Single Sort by REV scaled by Asse
 
t 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0100** 0.0066* 0.0076** 0.0099***  -0.0001  0.0115*** 0.0126*** 0.0146*** 0.0190***  0.0075***  0.0090***  0.0076 
 (2.31) (1.84) (2.49) (3.54)  (-0.05)  (4.27) (4.33) (4.38) (4.6)  (2.87)  (6)  (1.49) 
CAPM -0.0027 -0.0048*** -0.0028* 0.0001  0.0028  0.0019 0.0023* 0.0033*** 0.0065***  0.0045*  0.0092***  0.0017 
 (-1.29) (-2.81) (-1.94) (0.08)  (1.22)  (1.45) (1.93) (2.67) (3.37)  (1.92)  (6.4)  (0.38) 
FF3F -0.0008 -0.0056*** -0.0047*** -0.0030***  -0.0022  -0.0008 0.0007 0.0028*** 0.0084***  0.0092***  0.0092***  0.0114*** 
 (-0.53) (-4.25) (-4.29) (-3.14)  (-1.42)  (-0.78) (0.72) (2.93) (7.8)  (6.31)  (5.99)  (4.36) 
CAR4 0.0021 -0.0027*** -0.0025*** -0.0017*  -0.0037**  -0.0003 0.0016* 0.0039*** 0.0088***  0.0091***  0.0068***  0.0128*** 
 (1.44) (-2.69) (-2.74) (-1.88)  (-2.07)  (-0.26) (1.74) (4.34) (7.72)  (5.96)  (4.27)  (4.4) 
Panel B: Single Sort by REV scaled by Year-end Pric
 
e 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0101*** 0.0083** 0.0078** 0.0079***  -0.0022  0.0093*** 0.0122*** 0.0154*** 0.0213***  0.0120***  0.0112***  0.0142*** 
 (2.63) (2.43) (2.44) (2.61)  (-1.33)  (3.19) (3.96) (4.77) (5.97)  (8.17)  (8.55)  (4.99) 
CAPM -0.0016 -0.0028* -0.0029** -0.0028**  -0.0012  -0.0012 0.0014 0.0044*** 0.0099***  0.0111***  0.0115***  0.0123*** 
 (-0.83) (-1.73) (-2.02) (-2.45)  (-0.76)  (-1.2) (1.29) (3.55) (6.13)  (7.88)  (9.05)  (4.62) 
FF3F -0.0028** -0.0042*** -0.0040*** -0.0032***  -0.0005  -0.0014 0.0011 0.0034*** 0.0084***  0.0097***  0.0111***  0.0102*** 
 (-2.04) (-3.68) (-3.33) (-3.35)  (-0.33)  (-1.36) (1.13) (3.9) (8.14)  (7.68)  (8.15)  (4.34) 
CAR4 -0.0002 -0.0014* -0.0014 -0.0019**  -0.0016  -0.0007 0.0020** 0.0043*** 0.0085***  0.0092***  0.0088***  0.0108*** 
 (-0.21) (-1.65) (-1.48) (-2.11)  (-1.13)  (-0.68) (2.25) (5.19) (7.79)  (7.3)  (6.51)  (6.51) 
 
 
Panel C: Return Adjusted by Characteristics -DGTW 




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
RAW 0.0105*** 0.0084*** 0.0079*** 0.0075***  -0.0029*  0.0092*** 0.0124*** 0.0154*** 0.0212***  0.0120***  0.0107***  0.0149*** 
 (2.82) (2.6) (2.66) (2.65)  (-1.67)  (3.27) (4.33) (5.05) (6.26)  (8.47)  (8.26)  (5.19) 
SIZE -0.0002 -0.0025*** -0.0030*** -0.0032***  -0.0030*  -0.0013* 0.0014** 0.0043*** 0.0100***  0.0113***  0.0103***  0.0143*** 
 (-0.18) (-2.93) (-4.43) (-4.98)  (-1.94)  (-1.69) (2.31) (6.52) (11.82)  (9.68)  (7.76)  (6.09) 
SIZE/BM -0.0006 -0.0026*** -0.0029*** -0.0029***  -0.0022  -0.0008 0.0015** 0.0042*** 0.0095***  0.0103***  0.0101***  0.0125*** 
 (-0.49) (-3.15) (-4.53) (-4.55)  (-1.47)  (-1.14) (2.37) (6.51) (11.19)  (8.95)  (7.77)  (5.37) 
DGTW -0.0000 -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0029***  -0.0029**  -0.0007 0.0013** 0.0038*** 0.0087***  0.0094***  0.0087***  0.0123*** 




Table 8:  Single Sort on REV by Sub-period, and Exchange 
Table 8 presents the equal-weighted average monthly returns of the stocks in eight portfolios sorted based on alternative definitions of REV 
with a holding period of 1 month.  We also report the returns of two zero-cost trading strategies (P4-P1) and (P9-P6) that goes long P4 (P9) 
and short P1 (P6). Excessive returns are computed based on CAPM, Fama-French 3-Factor Model and Carhart 4-Factor Model. T-statistics 
based on Newy-West standard errors with 6 lags are reported below the returns in brackets. Panel A reports the results of the single-sort test 
by sub-periods while Panel B reports the results by exchange for the entire sample period from January 1983 to March 2008. Excessive 
returns are computed based on CAPM, Fama-French 3-Factor Model and Carhart 4-Factor Model. T-statistics based on Newy-West 
standard errors with 6 lags are reported below the returns in brackets.  
 
Panel A: By Sub-Periods  




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
1983 - 1995 
FF3F -0.0044*** -0.0052*** -0.0030*** -0.0012  0.0033**  0.0016 0.0038*** 0.0047*** 0.0084***  0.0068***  0.0129***  0.0036* 
 (-3.37) (-5.33) (-3.49) (-1.53)  (2.31)  (1.5) (4.12) (5.16) (8.02)  (5.9)  (8.4)  (1.79) 
CAR4 -0.0022* -0.0035*** -0.0020** -0.0010  0.0011  0.0013 0.0039*** 0.0049*** 0.0085***  0.0072***  0.0107***  0.0060*** 
 (-1.92) (-4.25) (-2.43) (-1.26)  (0.85)  (1.15) (4.12) (5.27) (7.59)  (6.17)  (6.87)  (3.06) 
1996 - 2008 
FF3F 0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0039** -0.0057***  -0.0063**  -0.0043*** -0.0009 0.0030* 0.0092***  0.0135***  0.0086***  0.0198*** 
 (0.22) (-1.07) (-2.18) (-4.08)  (-2.23)  (-3.19) (-0.78) (1.85) (5.01)  (5.99)  (3.78)  (4.35) 
CAR4 0.0055** 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0046***  -0.0101***  -0.0042*** -0.0003 0.0044*** 0.0114***  0.0156***  0.0059***  0.0257*** 
 (2.45) (0.87) (-0.88) (-3.18)  (-3.49)  (-2.85) (-0.25) (2.82) (6.22)  (6.2)  (2.77)  (5.22) 
 
Panel B: By Exchange  




 P1 P2 P3 P4  P4-P1  P6 P7 P8 P9  P9-P6   
NASDAQ 
FF3F -0.0017 -0.0044*** -0.0034** -0.0039***  -0.0021  -0.0028* 0.0030*** 0.0066*** 0.0114***  0.0142***  0.0131***  0.0163*** 
 (-0.83) (-2.75) (-2.19) (-2.89)  (-0.93)  (-1.92) (2.61) (4.56) (6.79)  (6.78)  (7.29)  (4.4) 
CAR4 0.0030 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0027*  -0.0057**  -0.0026 0.0038*** 0.0086*** 0.0135***  0.0161***  0.0106***  0.0218*** 
 (1.4) (-0.75) (-0.55) (-1.89)  (-2.03)  (-1.54) (3.27) (5.9) (7.05)  (5.9)  (5.83)  (4.33) 
AMEX/NYSE 
FF3F -0.0041** -0.0042*** -0.0045*** -0.0034***  0.0007  -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0050***  0.0058***  0.0091***  0.0050** 
 (-2.31) (-3.22) (-3.88) (-3.34)  (0.43)  (-0.68) (-0.3) (0.93) (4.2)  (4.52)  (6)  (1.99) 
CAR4 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0028*** -0.0029***  -0.0023  -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0058***  0.0067***  0.0064***  0.0089*** 
 (-0.53) (-1.56) (-2.6) (-2.81)  (-1.59)  (-0.81) (-0.23) (1.06) (4.96)  (5.26)  (4.77)  (3.98) 
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Figure 1:  Serial Correlation in Analyst Revisions 
Every year and for each stock, we separately estimate the upward autocorrelation (RhoUP) between positive REVt-1 and REVt and the 
downward autocorrelation (RhoDOWN) between negative REVt-1 and REVt, using a rolling window of four years. A minimum number of 20 
data points is required to estimate a meaningful correlation. The average RhoUP and RhoDOWN across all stocks from 1984 to 2005 are 
plotted in Panel A. Each year we divide all stocks into two groups with heavy or light coverage based on the median number of analyst 
providing earnings estimates in June. In the same way, we also assign each stock to low- or high- institutional holding groups based on 
variable INST median and big or small groups based on AMEX/NYSE size median.  Panel B, C and D plot the time series average of the 
Spearman RhoUP and RhoDOWN by size, analyst coverage and institutional holding groups. 
Panel A: In Positive and Negative Revisions 
 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation By Analyst Coverage 
 
Panel C: Spearman Correlation By Institutional Holding 
 


























































































Figure 2:  Past and Future Returns of Revision Portfolios 
Each month, we divide our sample of firms into 4 quartiles based on their REVt from low to high within REV- (REV+), with P1(P6) 
containing the lowest revision stocks and with P4(P9) containing the highest revision stocks. REVt is month on month change in analysts’ 
consensus (mean) earnings forecast. Panel A plot the average past six-month cumulative of eight portfolios in REV+ (P1-P4) and REV-(P6-
P9).  Panel B shows an X/Y scatter plot of the average revisions vs. average cumulative return in past six month for each of the REV 
portfolios for the entire sample period from January 1983 to March 2008.  
 
Panel A: Mean and Median Past Returns of Revision Portfolios 
 
Panel B: Mean Past Returns vs. Magnitude of Revisions 
 
Panel C: Mean Future Raw Returns vs. Magnitude of Revisions 
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